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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the sale and leaseback transaction gained prominence in
the 1940's, its financial and tax repercussions have been the subject
of much discussion among legal scholars. 2 Many of these scholars
1. Agar, Sales and Leasebacks, 18 A.B.A. SECTION TAX. (PT. 2), 61, 63 (1965); Cary,
Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax and Policy
Considerations, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1948).
2. Agar, supra note 1; Cary, supra note 1; Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and Lease-
backs as Practical Devices for Transfer and Operation of Real Property, 18 N.Y.U. INsT. FED.
TAX. 17 (H. Sellin ed. 1960); Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2
REAL EsT. L.J. 664 (1974); Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transactions of Real Property-A
Proposal, 30 TAx. LAW. 701 (1977); Wilson, Sales and Leasebacks, 16 U.S.C. TAX INsT. 149(J. Ervin ed. 1964).
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have analyzed the extensive use of the sale and leaseback as a fi-
nancing tool for business expansion. Other discussion has focused
on the unsettled state of the tax law in this area. Some recent
articles have analyzed the particular changes in the law3 brought
about by the recent cases of Leslie Co. v. Commissioner,I American
Realty Trust v. United Statess Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner," and
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.' These articles, however, have
primarily focused on the narrow issues presented in each case. Thus
the area is ripe for a comprehensive analysis of the financial and tax
aspects of the sale and leaseback transaction, the development of
the tax law concerning this transaction, and the recent cases in the
area. After such a comprehensive analysis, this Note will attempt
to determine the proper tax treatment of a sale and leaseback trans-
action.
This Note first discusses in detail the operation of a sale and
leaseback transaction and delineates its various uses. The Note next
points out the tax and financial advantages and disadvantages of
the sale and leaseback, sets forth the possible avenues of attack on
the transaction by the Internal Revenue Service (Service), and de-
scribes the consequences of a successful attack by the Service. The
final section of the Note analyzes the judicial treatment of sale and
leaseback transactions for tax purposes, focusing both on the tradi-
tional tests used by the courts and on changes in the law brought
about by recent United States Circuit and Supreme Court cases.8
This section also identifies problems arising from application of the
traditional tests and highlights the shortcomings of present judicial
analysis. The Note concludes by proposing several analytical meth-
ods for determining the proper tax treatment of a sale and leaseback
and by suggesting solutions to the problems that arise from the
present judicial analysis of these transactions.
II. OPERATION OF A SALE AND LEASEBACK TRANSACTION
A. Introduction
The phrase "sale and leaseback" is not a precisely defined term
3. Kaster, Sale-Leaseback: Effect on Net Leases of the Sun Oil Company Loan-or-
Lease Criteria, 48 J. TAx. 194 (1978); Zarrow & Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback
Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria, 49 J. TAX. 42 (1978); Note, Sale and Leaseback
Transactions-Loss on Sale Portion of Sale and Leaseback Transaction Deductible by Seller.
Lessee-Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 672 (1977).
4. 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
6. 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
7. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
8. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
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of art. Instead, it is used to describe a variety of transactions that
include the transfer of property and the subsequent leaseback of the
same property from the transferee to the original owner. These
transactions take a myriad of forms and transfer diverse types of
property, such as equipment, improved or unimproved real estate,
and intangible property. For various tax and financial reasons,' sev-
eral variations on the "true" sale and leasebacko have developed.
These include the gift and leaseback," the trust and leaseback,12
and the bootstrap sale and leaseback. 3 Although each of these vari-
ations has characteristics in common with the true sale and lease-
back, each possesses special attributes that are beyond the scope of
this Note. Rather than detail these variations, this Note focuses on
the tax and financial aspects of the true sale and leaseback transac-
tion, with particular emphasis on the real estate sale and leaseback.
Nevertheless, this discussion is generally applicable to all sale and
leaseback transactions, and specific references will be made to other
9. Transactions such as the gift and leaseback, and the trust and leaseback, are used
as income-splitting devices. See notes 11-12 infra. If successful these transactions can be used
to shift income from high-bracket to low-bracket taxpayers (usually within the same family).
The bootstrap sale and leaseback often provides 100% financing at relatively low interest
rates. See note 13 infra.
10. The "true" sale and leaseback includes a permanent transfer of property for valu-
able consideration (as opposed to a gift or contribution to capital) and a simultaneous lease-
back for a term of years.
11. The gift and leaseback includes an outright gift of property, usually to a relative or
a controlled corporation, and the subsequent leaseback of the property to the original owner.
If the original owner is in a higher tax bracket and the donee is in a low tax bracket, this
transaction can produce substantial tax savings by shifting income in the form of lease
payments to the low-bracket donee-lessor and providing the high-bracket donor-lessee with
a deduction for rents.
12. The trust and leaseback is a variation of the gift and leaseback. See note 11 supra.
If the donor does not wish to give the proposed donee full control of the transferred property
(or p~ssibly if the proposed donee is a minor), the donor may transfer the property in trust
for the benefit of the proposed donee and then lease the property back from the trust. This
transaction has the same results as a gift and leaseback, but does not have the attendant risk
that the donee may dispose of or squander the property or the related income. Tax conse-
quences in the trust and leaseback situation are less certain, however, especially if the trustee
is related to the donor of the property.
13. The bootstrap sale and leaseback includes the sale of property to a tax-exempt
organization, with the purchase price usually being represented by a note to the seller, and
the subsequent leaseback of the property to the original owner, or to a corporation controlled
by the original owner. The lease payments are set at a percentage of net income. The note is
nonrecourse and note payments are set at a percentage of the lease payments. This transac-
tion has the effect of "bailing out" ordinary income from the property at capital gains rates.
Further, if the tax-exempt purchaser is not required to pay tax on the income from the lease,
it will normally accept a lower rate of return on its investment (if any) than would be required
under a conventional financing technique. The use of the bootstrap sale and leaseback was
severely limited by the enactment of I.R.C. § 512, which taxes tax-exempt organizations on
unrelated business income. For a more detailed discussion of bootstrap sale and leaseback
transactions, see 11 Vn.L. L. REv. 563 (1966).
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types of sale and leaseback transactions, including the variations
mentioned above.
B. Description of a Sale and Leaseback Transaction
The typical real estate sale and leaseback transaction includes
the sale of land or land and buildings to an investor and the simulta-
neous leaseback of the property to the original owner. The investor
pays the seller either in cash or with a note and takes legal title to
the property. The seller-lessee then obligates itself to lease the prop-
erty for an extended term that may be less than, equal to, or greater
than the estimated useful life of any depreciable assets included in
the lease. The lease may also contain options to renew or options
for the seller-lessee to repurchase the property at a future date for
a stated price or for a price to be determined by a future appraisal.
If the transaction is upheld for tax purposes as a valid sale and
leaseback,14 the purchaser-lessor will have title to the property, will
receive ordinary income in the form of rental payments,15 and will
be allowed a tax deduction for depreciationl6 and for any interest
paid17 on indebtedness related to the property. The seller-lessee will
have both the asset and any related liabilities removed from his
books,18 will have in place of the land or building a current asset in
the form of cash or a note that may be factored, and will be allowed
a rental deduction for the lease payments."
The basic sale and leaseback transaction described above is
composed of several simple components-a sale for valuable consid-
eration, a lease for a term of years, and various options to renew or
repurchase. The possible combinations of these components, how-
ever, provide a flexible yet complex tool for financing or business
expansion. The consideration paid by the purchaser is generally the
fair market value of the property, but may be a lesser amount when
other aspects of the sale or the leaseback favor the seller. Rental
payments may be set at the fair rental value of the property, but
14. Sale and leaseback transactions may be held invalid for tax purposes for various
reasons. For example, the transaction may be classified as a tax-free § 1031 like-kind ex-
change or may be recharacterized as a mortgage loan. See text accompanying notes 48-54
infra.
15. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5).
16. I.R.C. § 167.
17. I.R.C. § 163.
18. Under certain circumstances, however, generally accepted accounting principles
require that the leasehold be capitalized and that the obligation to make future lease pay-
ments be shown on the books of account as a liability. FNActAL AccOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AccOUNTING STANDARDS No. 13, (Nov. 1976), reprinted in
11979] 3 AICPA PROF. STAND. (CCH) § 4053.
19. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
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are often set at a rate that will amortize the purchaser's investment
over the lease's primary term at a specified rate of return.20 This
procedure provides the purchaser with a safe, guaranteed return on
his investment. Repurchase and renewal options can also add flexi-
bility to a sale and leaseback transaction. The renewal option as-
sures the seller of continued use of property needed in his trade or
business even though he has relinquished title. In addition, the
original lease may state rentals for the renewal periods, enabling the
seller-lessee to ascertain its maximum future costs of land and
buildings. If the rental payments during the primary term of the
lease fully amortize the purchaser's investment, many purchaser-
lessors will accept reduced rent for the renewal periods. The repur-
chase option provides the seller with a means of reacquiring the
property if necessary due to future business developments. The op-
tion may allow repurchase at any time during the lease, only at
specified times, or only at the expiration of the lease. The option
price may be stated, determined by appraisal, or tied to the remain-
ing lease payments required to amortize the purchaser's investment.
In addition to the variations mentioned above, a sale and lease-
back may be structured as a multiple party transaction to provide
additional flexibility. For example, the seller or purchaser may be
a syndicate, joint venture, or group of individuals or corporations.
The purchaser may also arrange for one or more third party lending
institutions to finance the purchase, using the acquired property
and the lease as collateral and repaying the loan from the lease
payments. These additional possibilities make the real estate sale
and leaseback an extremely flexible and useful business tool.
C. Financial Considerations
Sale and leaseback transactions may be utilized for a variety
of business and financial purposes.2' A principal use is to provide the
seller-lessee with immediate cash to meet increased working capital
needs. 22 The sale and leaseback generally provides cash equal to 100
percent of the fair market value of the property sold, while conven-
tional financing techniques normally yield only 75-80 percent of the
fair market value of the property securing the loan. In essence, the
seller-lessee uses the sale and leaseback transaction to transform
20. This type of rental payment schedule closely resembles a mortgage payment sched-
ule that provides for repayment of principal and interest in installments at a specified interest
rate.
21. See Cary, supra note 1; Morris, supra note 2.
22. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 944 (1978); Agar, supra note 1, at 62.
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fixed assets into working capital while retaining possession and use
of the property. As a side effect, this technique can provide a better
balance sheet position for the seller-lessee, which enables it to ob-
tain a greater amount of conventional financing in the future. The
seller-lessee obtains this better balance sheet position by increasing
current assets with the proceeds of the sale and thereby increasing
its current ratio, an important determinant of credit standing."
Many companies have found the sale and leaseback transaction
a useful means for financing expansion of facilities or obtaining
funds for construction. This technique has been especially prevalent
in the retail sales industry. Many businesses in this industry must
make a significant investment in their physical plant, and simulta-
neously require large amounts of working capital for inventory and
operating expenses. If the business is growing rapidly, the working
capital requirements often become so great that the business finds
needed expansion of its physical plant impossible to finance. These
businesses often expand or build new stores and then enter into sale
and leaseback transactions 24 to convert fixed assets into working
capital?
Another use of the sale and leaseback transaction is to obtain
financing in a tight money market. 26 When credit is tight and con-
ventional financing is difficult to obtain, investors may be willing
to enter into a sale and leaseback transaction as a substitute for a
loan because ownership of property provides a hedge against infla-
tion for the investor and also eliminates legal problems connected
with foreclosure and collection of debt if the seller is unable to meet
his obligations.?
In addition to the advantages listed above, a seller-lessee may
be able to use a sale and leaseback transaction to circumvent loan
restrictions or state and federal regulations. Although loan agree-
23. The current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Lending institu-
tions view this ratio as an indicator of a debtor's ability to service immediate obligations
under short-term loans. When fixed assets are sold the cash received increases current assets
without a corresponding increase in current liabilities, thus increasing the current ratio and
providing the debtor with a better credit standing for short-term borrowing.
24. Some of the major retail sales concerns that have taken advantage of this technique
include Allied Stores Corp., Federated Department Stores, Inc., Gimbel's, Sears Roebuck and
Co., and Montgomery Ward & Company. Cary, supra note 1, at 2 n.4.
25. This technique is also used by contractors to acquire funds for independent con-
struction. The contractor first purchases a construction site with his own funds and then
enters into a sale and leaseback transaction to obtain financing necessary to construct a
building on the site.
26. Mandell, supra note 2, at 18.
27. Since the lessor owns legal title to the property, he need not go through foreclosure
proceedings to take possession of the property. Further, the property will not be tied up in
any bankruptcy proceedings that may ensue if the lessee becomes insolvent.
950 [Vol. 32:945
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ments often contain provisions limiting additional borrowing and
requiring the debtor to meet certain ratio tests,28 leaseback agree-
ments seldom have similar provisions.2 9 Moreover, the parties often
can structure the sale and leaseback transaction so that it does not
breach provisions of prior loan agreements that conventional financ-
ing techniques would violate. Also, several state and federal regula-
tions relating to the ownership of property by certain organizations
do not apply to leaseholds under a sale and leaseback transaction. 0
The purchaser-lessor in a sale and leaseback may also obtain
certain financial advantages from the transaction. The rate of re-
turn is generally higher on a sale and leaseback than on a loan
secured by the same property."1 The investor in a sale and leaseback
procures this higher return because he takes additional risks by
investing 100 percent of the fair market value of the property, rather
than the lower percentage generally securing a loan. In addition, by
entering a sale and leaseback transaction rather than a conventional
loan, he foregoes any rights he would have as a creditor under a
mortgage loan. 32 Moreover, the purchaser-lessor can often circum-
vent state usury laws by utilizing a sale and leaseback and thereby
obtain a greater yield than would be available under a mortgage
loan. Another significant advantage to the purchaser-lessor is that
the ownership of property provides a hedge against inflation since
any appreciation in value will accrue to the owner.33 Finally, since
most leasebacks are "net leases,"3 the purchaser has a relatively
management-free investment with a built-in tenant and a guaran-
teed return.
28. These ratio tests include the current ratio, debt-equity ratio, and quick asset ratio.
These ratios are indicators of the debtor's continued ability to service its debt.
29. Agar, supra note 1, at 63.
30. For example, the Federal Reserve System places limits on the amount a banking
institution can invest in its banking premises. Banks can circumvent these limits by a sale
and leaseback transaction. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
31. Agar, supra note 1, at 74; Marcus, supra note 2, at 668 n.8.
32. These rights include the ability to force a debtor into bankruptcy, to obtain pre-
ferred status in bankruptcy, to sue upon the debt for execution or garnishment, and to
participate in a bankruptcy distribution to the full extent of the creditor's investment.
33. This hedge against inflation may be limited or eliminated if the lease contains a
repurchase option that sets the option price at anything other than the fair market value of
the property at the time the option is exercised. Any other type of repurchase option is likely
to allow the lessee to enjoy partially or fully the benefits of any appreciation. See Agar, supra
note 1, at 73-74.
34. A net lease is an arrangement under which the lessee pays all taxes, assessments,
maintenance, and other expenses related to the property. The lessor thus receives his rent




In addition to numerous business and financial reasons, the
attendant tax considerations are often a principal factor in the deci-
sion to utilize a sale and leaseback.35 From the viewpoint of the
seller-lessee, one of the principal tax advantages of a valid sale and
leaseback is that the rental payments under the lease are fully de-
ductible.36 This provides a significantly greater deduction than
would be available under conventional financing techniques in
which only the interest payments are deductible. In addition, if the
property consists primarily of a nondepreciable asset, such as land,
the full rental deduction has the effect of allowing a depreciation
deduction for the nondepreciable portion of the property.37 The full
rental deduction is, however, only part of the tax picture. To deter-
mine the net tax advantage or disadvantage of a sale and leaseback,
the seller must take into consideration the loss of a depreciation
deduction upon the sale of the property. In many situations this loss
of depreciation more than offsets the advantage gained from the full
rental deduction, particularly if the property consists principally of
improvements that may be depreciated at accelerated rates.
A second advantage to the seller in a sale and leaseback is its
usefulness in timing the realization of gains or losses. If a business
has assets with a fair market value below their adjusted basis, it
may be advantageous from a tax standpoint for the business to
dispose of the assets and use the loss to offset other income. If,
however, the assets are necessary for the operation of the business,
an outright sale is impossible. Under these circumstances the busi-
ness can utilize a sale and leaseback transaction to realize the loss
for tax purposes and still retain possession and use of the property.38
On the other hand, if a business owns assets that have appreciated
to a value above their adjusted basis, the business may want to
realize the gain in order to take advantage of investment credit or
net-operating-loss carryovers that are about to expire., A sale of the
35. Agar, supra note 1, at 62.
36. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
37. Although land cannot be depreciated, rental payments for the use of land are a fully
deductible expense. Since rental payments under leaseback arrangements include a payment
for the use of any land transferred, the lessee is allowed a deduction (analogous to deprecia-
tion) for the use of the land.
38. The Service, however, may attempt to deny any loss on such transaction by claim-
ing that the transaction is a tax-free § 1031 like-kind exchange. See text accompanying notes
48-53 infra.
39. Investment credit and net-operating-loss carryovers that are not fully utilized in the
year in which they occur or in carryback years may be carried forward for seven taxable years.
These carryovers are lost if not utilized during this seven year period. I.R.C. §§ 46(b), 172(b).
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assets would result in realization of gain that could be offset by the
credits or losses. If the assets were being used in a trade or business,
any excess gain would be taxed at the reduced capital gains rates.4 0
Once again, however, if the assets are necessary for the operation of
the business, an outright sale is impossible and the business must
resort to a sale and leaseback transaction. This technique is not
without hazards. First, any gain on the sale of appreciated assets
may be subject to investment credit or depreciation recapture,' and
therefore taxed at ordinary income rates. This taxation may offset
any advantage of the sale and leaseback. Second, the sale and lease-
back may be characterized as a tax-free section 1031 like-kind ex-
change (an exchange of the property for the resulting leasehold).42
If this is the case, no gain or loss will be recognized on the transac-
tion and the utility of this sale and leaseback technique will be
destroyed.
From the viewpoint of the purchaser-lessor, a sale and lease-
back transaction has certain limited tax advantages. The purchaser
owns the property and can claim a depreciation deduction that can
be used to offset part of the income from the property. 3 If acceler-
ated depreciation methods are available, the depreciation deduction
may fully offset income during the early years of the lease and also
provide a tax shelter for other income." If the purchaser financed
the acquisition of the property, he will be allowed an interest deduc-
tion that will further offset ordinary income. Perhaps the greatest
tax advantage of a sale and leaseback transaction arises when the
purchaser is a tax-exempt organization, such as a charitable organi-
zation or a pension fund. In this case., if the purchase is for cash,
all income from the lease is exempt from taxation. If the leaseback
utilizes a net lease provision," the sale and leaseback provides the
organization with a management-free, tax-free, high-yield invest-
ment. This technique loses some of its utility, however, if the pur-
chase of the property is financed and therefore subject to the
"unrelated business income" rules of section 511.6 This section in-
cludes in the taxable income of tax-exempt organizations a percen-
40. I.R.C. § 1231.
41. I.R.C. H§ 47 (investment credit recapture), 1245, 1250 (depreciation recapture).
42. See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra.
43. I.R.C. § 167.
44. Even though the use of accelerated depreciation methods will reduce depreciation
deductions available during the later years of the lease, the time value of money makes it
advantageous for the lessor to take the greater deduction in the earlier years if possible.
45. For a description of a net lease, see note 34 supra.
46. I.R.C. §§ 511-514. Most bootstrap sale and leaseback transactions are financed and
thus have limited utility.
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tage of the total rents received from "business leases" that is equal
to the ratio of business lease indebtedness to the adjusted basis of
the property. 7 As a result, the organization is taxed on part or all
of the income from the lease, which destroys the advantage of the
sale and leaseback.
E. Internal Revenue Service Treatment of Sale and Leaseback
Transactions
Despite the potential tax and financial advantages of the sale
and leaseback transaction, significant hazards accompany use of
this technique. The Service has repeatedly challenged the validity
of sale and leaseback transactions, employing three principal meth-
ods of attack. The first arises under section 1031 of the Code, which
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized when property held
for productive use in a trade or business is exchanged for property
of a like kind." The section further states that if the exchange is for
like-kind property plus other property or money, no loss will be
recognized, and the gain will be recognized only to the extent of the
value of the other property or money received." Treasury regula-
tions promulgated under this section indicate that real estate and
a real property leasehold of thirty or more years are like-kind prop-
erty."o Based on this section and regulation, the Service often argues
that a sale coupled with a leaseback for more than thirty years
constitutes a like-kind exchange upon which no gain or loss will be
recognized.51 If the Service successfully presses this argument, dras-
tic tax consequences for the seller may result. If the seller entered
into the sale and leaseback in order to produce a loss to offset ordi-
nary income,52 it may be subject to a significant deficiency assess-
ment when the loss is denied.53 If the purpose of entering into the
47. Treasury Regulation § 1.514(a)-1(a)(1)(iv) (1972) gives the following example of the
operation of this rule:
(iv) Example. Subdivisions (i), (ii), and (iii) of this subparagraph are illustrated by
the following example. For purposes of this example it is assumed that the property is
debt-financed property.
Example. X, an exempt trade association, owns an office building which in 1971 pro-
duces $10,000 of gross rental income. The average adjusted basis of the building for 1971
is $100,000, and the average acquisition indebtedness with respect to the building for
1971 is $50,000. Accordingly, the debt/basis percentage for 1971 is 50 percent (the ratio
of $50,000 to $100,000). Therefore, the unrelated debt-financed income with respect to
the building for 1971 is $5,000 (50% of $10,000).
48. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
49. I.R.C. § 1031(b)-(c).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c) (1967).
51. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
52. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
53. See Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
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transaction was to produce gain in order to take advantage of expir-
ing investment credit or net-operating-loss carryovers, these carry-
overs may be lost if the gain is not recognized under section 1031.
A second way in which the Service can attack a sale and lease-
back is to recharacterize the transaction as a mortgage loan with the
property pledged as security." The Service utilizes this procedure
when the sale and leaseback appears to be a substitute for conven-
tional financing and the seller retains substantial control. If the
Service succeeds in recharacterizing the sale and leaseback as a
mortgage loan, several tax consequences ensue. The seller-lessee is
not allowed a rental deduction for the full amount of the lease pay-
ments, but instead is allowed to deduct only a portion of the pay-
ments as interest. In addition, because the purchaser will not be
considered the owner of the property, it will not be allowed any
deduction for depreciation. Mitigating factors exist, however, in
that the seller is allowed a depreciation deduction, and the pur-
chaser need only include in income the portion of the lease payment
that constitutes interest. Nevertheless, in many situations (espe-
cially if the purchaser is a tax-exempt organization) the tax conse-
quences of a recharacterization of a sale and leaseback are disas-
trous.
The last method used by the Service to attack a sale and lease-
back does not focus on the validity of the transaction, but rather
concentrates on the fairness of the rental payments under the lease.
This method is used principally when the rent charged during the
later years of the lease or during renewal periods is dispropor-
tionately low in relation to that charged during the early years.
Under these circumstances, the Service characterizes part of the
payments during the primary term as prepaid rent and requires that
they be capitalized and amortized over the full term of the lease. 5
This treatment in essence amounts to the deferral of a deduction.
Because this method does not strike at the validity of the entire
transaction, it does not have the harsh effect on the parties that the
Service's successful use of the section 1031 attack or mortgage-loan
recharacterization has.
342 U.S. 954 (1952) (denying the loss deduction, but allowing the loss to be amortized over
the life of the lease as a capitalized expense related to acquiring the lease).
54. For a further discussion of this method of attack, see Part III(C) infra.
55. See Agar, supra note 1, at 65; Mandell, supra note 2, at 24.
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III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SALE AND LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS
A. Introduction
For over thirty-five years courts have grappled with the ques-
tion of the proper tax treatment of a sale and leaseback, and have
yet to find a satisfactory solution. An analysis of sale and leaseback
cases shows that courts have taken various approaches in dealing
with the Service's attacks on sale and leaseback transactions. The
following sections describe and analyze the tests used by the courts
to determine the proper tax treatment of sale and leaseback transac-
tions in light of the Service's two most prevalent attacks-the sec-
tion 1031 like-kind exchange approach and recharacterization as a
mortgage loan.
B. Section 1031 Like-Kind Exchange
Courts have divided on the issue whether a sale and leaseback
for a term of thirty or more years is a section 1031 like-kind ex-
change. An examination of two United States courts of appeals
cases, Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner" and Jordan Marsh
Co. v. Commissioner,17 best explains this division of opinion. In
Century Electric the taxpayer sold a foundry used in its business for
$150,000 when its adjusted basis was over $531,000. Simultaneously,
the property was leased back to the taxpayer for ninety-five years,
subject to the right of the seller-lessee to terminate the lease after
twenty-five years. Evidence indicated -that the fair market value of
the property at the time of the sale and leaseback was between
$200,000 and $250,000. When the taxpayer deducted a loss on the
sale of over $381,000 (the difference between the sales price and the
adjusted basis), the Service denied the deduction. The Eighth Cir-
cuit upheld the Service's denial of the deduction on the ground that
the sale and leaseback were part of an integrated transaction that
constituted a like-kind exchange 8 of the property for $150,000 in
cash plus a ninety-five year lease on the same property.
In Jordan Marsh, a case with quite similar facts, the Second
Circuit reached the opposite result. The taxpayer in Jordan Marsh
sold a store used in its business at a substantial loss. At the same
time, the taxpayer leased back the store for a period of thirty years
and three days with an option to renew for an additional thirty
years. The stipulated facts of the case indicated that the sales price
56. 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
57. 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).
58. This case was decided pursuant to § 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the
predecessor of the present § 1031.
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of the property was its fair market value and that the rental pay-
ments equaled the property's fair rental value. The taxpayer took a
tax deduction for the loss on the sale. Characterizing the transac-
tion as a like-kind exchange," the Service denied the deduction. The
court rejected the Service's argument and allowed the claimed loss
deduction. Indicating that, in its view, there had been no exchange
of property for a long-term lease, the court concluded that the trans-
action was a valid sale with a resulting deductible loss. 0
Although the two cases are arguably distinguishable on their
facts because the evidence in Century Electric indicated that the
sale of the property was for less than its fair market value, most
courts and commentators view the cases as inherently in conflict."
This perceived conflict has caused significant confusion. Thus the
Service's section 1031 attack on sale and leaseback transactions has
met with varying degrees of success in the lower courts, depending
on whether the particular court accepted the rationale of Century
Electric or Jordan Marsh.
The most recent court of appeals case to address the split be-
tween Century Electric and Jordan Marsh was Leslie Co. v.
Commissioner,2 in which the Third Circuit confronted the issue of
how to treat a loss to the seller-lessee on the sale component of a
sale and leaseback transaction. Although the facts in Leslie differ
from those in both Century Electric and Jordan Marsh, the Leslie
court considered the issue to be the same and held that Jordan
Marsh was controlling. In Leslie taxpayer entered into an agreement
with Prudential Life Insurance Company under which Prudential
was to purchase a plant newly constructed by taxpayer and simulta-
neously lease it back to taxpayer for thirty years plus renewal peri-
ods. The purchase price to Prudential was to be the lesser of
$2,400,000 or the actual cost to taxpayer. Because the completed
structure cost over $3,100,000 taxpayer took a deduction for its loss
on the sale of over $700,000. Contending that the transaction was a
section 1031 like-kind exchange of property, the Service denied the
loss deduction.
When taxpayer appealed the Service's denial of the deduction,
the Tax Court rejected the Service's section 1031 argument, holding
59. This case was decided pursuant to § 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the
predecessor of the present § 1031.
60. The Service has announced that it will not follow the Jordan Marsh decision. Rev.
Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 687.
61. E.g., Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976); Mandell, supra note
2, at 29; Wilson, supra note 2, at 157.
62. 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976).
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that the transaction was not a like-kind exchange. 3 The Tax Court
based its decision on findings of fact that the $2,400,000 purchase
price paid by Prudential was approximately the fair market value
of the property and that the lease payments by taxpayer equaled the
property's fair rental value. These findings indicated that there had
been a sale for full consideration rather than an exchange. In affirm-
ing the Tax Court, the Third Circuit considered the rationales of
both Century Electric and Jordan Marsh. Indicating that it consid-
ered the cases to be in conflict, the court elected to follow the ap-
proach of the Second Circuit in Jordan Marsh." Accordingly, the
court held that when a taxpayer sells its property unconditionally
for cash equal to its fair market value and pays fair rental value for
any leasehold it acquires, no property other than cash is received on
the sale and there is no exchange for purposes of section 1031. The
court concluded that since section 1031 did not apply, the loss de-
duction should be allowed.
Leslie underscores the importance of structuring sale and lease-
back transactions so that the purchase price approximates the fair
market value of the property. Under the Leslie rationale, the pur-
chase price appears to be the crucial factor if the taxpayer desires
to deduct a loss on the sale. If the transaction meets both the fair
market value and the fair rental value tests, Leslie's interpretation
of Jordan Marsh would allow a loss deduction. Leslie does not,
however, resolve the conflict between Century Electric and Jordan
Marsh. The Third Circuit simply aligns itself with the Jordan
Marsh court without applying any original analysis, and therefore
leaves unchanged the underlying conflict between the cases.
Century Electric, Jordan Marsh, and Leslie typify situations in
which the Service will characterize a sale and leaseback as a section
1031 like-kind exchange. The conflict between Century Electric on
the one hand and Jordan Marsh and Leslie on the other highlights
the difficulty courts have had in determining the proper application
of section 1031 to this type of sale and leaseback transaction. This
63. 64 T.C. 247 (1975).
64. The court stated:
Thus we may interpret the essential difference between Jordan Marsh and Century
Electric as centering on their respective views of the need to value property involved in
a sale and leaseback. . . .
We are persuaded that the Jordan Marsh approach is a more satisfactory one. First,
it is supported by the Commissioner's own definition of "exchange" which distinguishes
an exchange from a transfer of property solely for a money consideration. . . . Second,
if resort is to be had to legislative history, it appears to us that the view of Congressional
purpose taken by the Jordan Marsh court is sounder than that of the Eighth Circuit in
Century.
539 F.2d at 948-49 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Note suggests, however, that whatever conflict appears to exist
arises not from a disagreement as to the proper application of sec-
tion 1031, but rather because in two of the three cases section 1031
analysis should not have been applied at all. Although the Service
and the courts viewed each of these cases as containing a similar
factual situation that had to be decided under section 1031, when
viewed in terms of economic substance, they represent three dis-
tinct situations. Section 1031 should be applied to only one of the
three cases.
Of the three cases, Century Electric is the only one that in-
cluded any exchange of properties. In both Jordan Marsh and Leslie
the taxpayer received in cash the fair market value of the property
sold; the resulting leasehold had no independent value and was not
given in "exchange" for the property. In Century Electric, however,
the taxpayer received less than the fair market value of the property
in cash and also received a valuable leasehold on the property. The
lease in Century Electric apparently" required a rental payment
that was less than the fair rental value of the property. This reduced
rental gave the leasehold independent value. It is clear, therefore,
that the leasehold constituted additional consideration received by
taxpayer on the sale. Only in this type of sale and leaseback situa-
tion, when the leasehold has independent value, should it be con-
sidered part of the consideration for the property. Only under these
circumstances, therefore, can section 1031 possibly have any appli-
cation to a sale and leaseback because only under these circumstan-
ces is there an exchange of property to which section 1031 can apply.
In the Jordan Marsh and Leslie situations section 1031 was irrele-
vant and should not have been applied.
Since Century Electric is the only case to which section 1031
was technically applicable, analysis of each case in terms of section
1031 has caused an apparent conflict in tax treatment that should
not exist. If each case is properly analyzed in terms of its economic
substance, the appropriate tax treatment is more easily discernible.
In terms of economic substance the three fact situations presented
by these cases can be summarized, though somewhat simplistically,
as follows. In Century Electric the taxpayer exchanged his property
for cash plus a valuable leasehold, the value of which is measured
by the difference between the value of the cash or other property
received and the fair market value of the property transferred. In
Jordan Marsh the taxpayer closed out a losing venture by selling
property for cash equal to its fair market value and simultaneously
65. The Court did not expressly state that the lease included reduced rentals. The
record, however, contained evidence indicating that the rentals were below the fair rental
value of the property.
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acquired a lease of no independent value under which it paid a fair
rental. In Leslie the taypayer constructed specific property as one
step in a series of transactions designed to culminate in a sale and
leaseback. The remainder of this section will present an analysis of
these three fact situations and will suggest that courts can deter-
mine proper tax treatment for each without conflict.
(1) Century Electric
Because Century Electric considered an exchange of the fee
ownership of property in part for a valuable leasehold, it presented
a situation in which section 1031 analysis could technically be ap-
plied. Section 1031, however, constitutes only one of three possible
tax treatments of this type of transaction and is the least desirable
of the three. First, one negative effect of applying section 1031 to a
Century Electric situation is that it creates a disparity of tax treat-
ment between sale and leaseback transactions including leases that
run for less than thirty years and those including leases that run for
more than thirty years." This disparity is not based on any eco-
nomic difference between the transactions, but instead results from
an arbitrary distinction drawn by the Service in an attempt to pre-
vent perceived tax abuses by expanding section 1031 to cover certain
sale and leaseback transactions. Second, and more important, the
application of section 1031 to a Century Electric situation does not
effectuate the policy underlying section 1031. Although courts have
disagreed on the primary policy underlying this section 7 and al-
though the legislative history of the section leaves room for specula-
tion,"1 the Second Circuit seems to have reached the best conclusion
in Jordan Marsh-the primary purpose of the nonrecognition provi-
sion in section 1031 is to avoid the inequity of forcing a taxpayer to
recognize a paper gain or loss that is tied up in a continuing invest-
ment of the same sort." In view of this policy, section 1031 should
66. This disparity arises from the Service's implied statement in Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1031(a)-1(c) that a real estate lease for a term of 30 or more years is the equivalent of the
ownership of a fee for purposes of § 1031. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
67. The Century Electric court concluded that the purpose of the section was to avoid
valuation problems. 192 F.2d at 159. The Jordan Marsh court concluded that the purpose of
the section was to avoid the inequity of forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain or loss
that was tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort. 269 F.2d at 456.
68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(pt. 2) 250-52; H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
(pt. 2) 175.
69. 269 F.2d at 456. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the following state-
ments from the legislative history of § 1031.
The provision is so indefinite that it cannot be applied with accuracy or with consis-
tency. It appears best to provide generally that gain or loss is recognized from all ex-
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not be applied to a Century Electric situation. Although under cer-
tain circumstances a leasehold may be very similar to the fee owner-
ship of property,70 the normal lease situation presents significant
differences that make section 1031 inapplicable. The lessor has the
reversionary interest in the property and has the power over its
ultimate control and disposition. In addition, the lessor generally
carries all of the risks of depreciation and receives the benefits of
appreciation in the value of the property. A seller-lessee in a sale
and leaseback therefore makes a significant change in the economic
substance of his investment as well as in its form. Thus the charac-
terization of a sale and leaseback as a section 1031 exchange does
not effectuate section 1031's policy of deferring recognition of gain
or loss on transactions that do not result in a change in the type of
investment owned.71 The only situation in which the policy underly-
ing section 1031 might be effectuated by characterizing a sale and
leaseback as a like-kind exchange is when the property consists
primarily of an asset that has a limited useful life equal to or shorter
than the term of the lease. Arguably, ownership of a leasehold cover-
ing the property's entire useful life is essentially equivalent to own-
ership of a fee, and therefore the sale and leaseback is a like-kind
exchange. Even this situation, however, should not be treated as a
section 1031 exchange. In terms of economic substance, the situa-
tion is equivalent to the sale of a fee interest for cash and the re-
acquisition of essentially the same interest for a price equal to
the payments required under the lease. This type of transaction
changes, and then except specifically and in definite terms those cases of exchanges in
which it is not desired to tax the gain or allow the loss. This results in definiteness and
accuracy and enables a taxpayer to determine prior to the consummation of a given
transaction the tax liability that will result.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 250.
The law has provided for 12 years that gain or loss is recognized on exchanges of
property having a fair market value, such as stocks, bonds, and negotiable instruments;
on exchanges of property held primarily for sale; or on exchanges of one kind of property
for another kind of property; but not on other exchanges of property solely for property
of like kind. In other words, profit or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes
or securities, which are essentially like money; or in the case of stock in trade; or in case
the taxpayer exchanges the property comprising his original investment for a different
kind of property; but if the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind of property
as that in which it was originally invested, he is not allowed to compute and deduct his
theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a tax upon his theoretical profit.
The calculation of the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in cash, marketable
securities, or other property not of the same kind having a fair market value.
House Ways and Means Committee Report, reprinted in, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 564 (emphasis
in original).
70. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
71. This Note argues that a real estate leasehold, even if long term, and a fee interest
in real estate are not like-kind property.
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properly should be characterized as a sale and immediate repur-
chase of the property having no tax effects for the seller-lessee,7 2
and section 1031 should, not be applied.13
Instead of applying section 1031 to a Century Electric sale and
leaseback, one of two alternative tax treatments should be applied
to yield a result more fully in accord with the economic realities of
the situation. The first alternative is to characterize the transaction
as a sale of property for a package of consideration consisting of the
cash 4 received plus a leasehold that includes a rental less than the
fair rental value of the property.75 This lease with reduced. rent is
an economic benefit to the seller-lessee, the value of which can be
measured by the difference between the cash received and the fair
market value of the property. The transaction would then be treated
as any other sale; the value of the consideration received (cash or
72. See text accompanying note 77 infra. After the transaction is consumated the seller-
lessee owns essentially the same interest as he owned before the sale and leaseback. In essence
the sale transaction is one of form and not substance. Under these circumstances the seller-
lessee should not be allowed to recognize a loss.
Another way of reaching this result would be to treat the sale and leaseback as a sham
transaction. Since the sale portion of the sale and leaseback has no economic substance, it
appears that its only purpose is to effect a recognition of a paper loss for tax purposes.
Permitting this type of loss would allow form to rule over substance, and thus the loss should
not be allowed. Although this sham transaction treatment reaches the result of denying the
loss, the sale and repurchase treatment described above is a more proper analytical approach.
73. From the standpoint of the purchaser-lessor this transaction is equivalent to a loan
in which the lender has taken title to the property as security for repayment. Payment
received by the purchaser-lessor under this type of lease should therefore be treated for tax
purposes partially as repayment of principal and partially as payment of interest.
74. As used here, the term "cash" includes all forms of consideration that might be
included in the transaction except for the leasehold (e.g., other property, securities, debt
instruments).
75. In any arms length sale transaction, it can be assumed that a reasonable seller will
not dispose of his property at a price less than its fair market value. If the cash received in
an arms length sale is less than the fair market value of the property then it can also be
assumed that the seller has received some additional compensation or benefit. In the situation
when the lease rentals are less than the fair rental value of the property there is an obvious
economic benefit to the seller that should be characterized as part of the consideration for
the property. In this situation the seller has actually received an economic benefit equal to
the fair market value of the property. It is possible, however, that a seller may benefit from
the sale and leaseback in ways that are more difficult to state in economic terms. This
situation could arise if the property is unique to the seller's business, to him, or if the sale
and leaseback transaction itself has a value to the seller because of his unique business or
financial situation. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). Under these
circumstances the seller may also be willing to accept an amount of cash less than the fair
market value of the property in order to obtain this additional benefit. Although this type of
benefit is difficult to value, if the sale and leaseback is an arms length transaction it appears
that the value of the benefit to the seller is the difference between the cash received and the
fair market value of the property. Even if this type of benefit can be valued, however, there
is a significant question whether this benefit is one that should be characterized as considera-
tion for tax purposes. This question is beyond the scope of this Note.
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other property plus the value of the leasehold) would be deducted
from the taxpayer's basis in the property and the difference would
be a deductible loss. In addition, the value of the leasehold would
be amortized over the life of the lease. This treatment fully accords
with the economic substance of a Century Electric transaction. The
original owner of the property has changed his interest from fee
ownership to a leasehold, and thus has substantially altered his
investment in the property." As a result, he does not have a continu-
ing investment of the same sort as before the transaction. In fact,
he has closed out a losing venture, the fee ownership of the property,
in return for valuable consideration, the cash and the leasehold, and
now has a new type of investment, the use and ownership of a
leasehold. In this situation the taxpayer has suffered an actual eco-
nomic loss equal to the difference between his basis in the property
and the combined value of the leasehold and the cash received.
Under the tax principles embodied in section 165 of the Internal
Revenue Code," this loss should be allowed as a deduction. Allowing
this loss deduction does not reinstate the tax abuse that the Service
perceived in the Century Electric case. In that case taxpayer at-
tempted to deduct a loss greater than the actual economic loss
suffered. This situation arose because taxpayer attempted to deduct
the difference between his basis in the property sold and the cash
he received, without taking into consideration the value of the lease-
hold acquired in the transaction. Under the proposed analysis, how-
ever, in an arms length sale the consideration received (the cash
plus the leasehold) will always equal the fair market value of the
property. Thus any loss determined under this approach will be an
actual economic loss and should be allowed as a deduction under
section 165.
The principal argument against this tax treatment of a Century
Electric sale and leaseback is that it would violate the policy under-
pinning section 1031 by allowing a taxpayer to recognize a loss even
though he retains an interest in the property sold. The fallacy of this
argument is apparent, however, if it is recognized that the policy of
section 1031 is not to prevent recognition of gain or loss when the
taxpayer retains an interest in the property, but rather is to apply
nonrecognition treatment only when the taxpayer retains a like-
kind investment in the same sort of property. In the normal sale and
leaseback situation the taxpayer substantially changes his interest
in the property and does not retain a like-kind investment. Even
76. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
77. Section 165 provides general rules for the deductibility of losses.
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though he retains an interest in the property, the deduction of his
loss does not violate the policy underlying section 1031. Only in the
limited situation in which the leasehold is actually equivalent to fee
ownership-when the lease covers the full useful life of the property
and when the lessee has the rights of ownership (such as the benefits
and risks from appreciation or depreciation)-does the possibility of
violating the policy underpinning section 1031 exist. Even in this
situation, however, the Service and the courts should not attempt
to prevent the possible violation through an application of section
1031 principles. Again, this Note proposes that the lease be viewed
in terms of its economic substance. From this perspective, a lease
that is equivalent to fee ownership should be characterized as a
purchase contract rather than a lease. Under this approach, a sale
and leaseback transaction could be deemed a sale of the property
coupled with an immediate repurchase. This characterization fully
accords with the economic realities of the situation. The transaction
could then be treated as a wash sale having no tax consequences,
leaving the taxpayer in the same position as before the sale and
leaseback.18 This treatment of sale and leaseback transactions
would both prevent the abuses that the Service is attempting to
avoid by utilizing section 1031, and provide equitable tax treatment
for the taxpayer who has in fact closed out a losing venture and
acquired another type of investment.
The second alternative tax treatment of a Century Electric sit-
uation is to treat the taxpayer as having transferred title to the
property in return for valuable consideration while retaining a lease-
hold interest in the property. 9 This situation is analogous to the
transfer of a fee subject to a retained interest for a term of years.
For tax purposes, the cost basis in the property would be appor-
tioned between the fee interest sold and the leasehold retained on
the basis of the fair market value of each." Any gain or loss on the
transaction would be calculated by comparing the amount received
on the sale with the basis allocated to the fee interest. The basis
remaining in the leasehold would then be amortized over the term
of the lease. Once again, this treatment accords more closely with
the economic realities of the transaction than does section 1031
treatment. Furthermore, it operates to prevent the abuses that the
78. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
79. This approach has been previously suggested by at least one commentator. See
Morris, supra note 2.
80. The fair market value of the fee interest would be the amount a willing buyer would
pay for the property in an arms length transaction. The fair market value of the leasehold
would be the difference between the fair market value of the property and the cash or other
consideration received by the seller.
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Service attempts to eliminate through its section 1031 attack. After
a consummated sale and leaseback, the seller-lessee, who once held
all of the ownership interests in the property, holds only a portion
of those interests. The terms of the lease determine the limits and
therefore the value of this portion of the interests. As these interests
approach the equivalent of a fee interest, the leasehold will have a
higher fair market value and the fee interest a lower fair market
value. When the lessee's interest approximates a fee interest, the
latter will be allocated only a small portion of the property's cost
basis, which reduces or eliminates any possible loss on the sale. This
approach effectively prevents a taxpayer from recognizing a paper
loss while still retaining an investment in the property that is essen-
tially equivalent to his prior fee ownership. If, on the other hand,
the interests retained by the seller-lessee do not approximate a fee
interest, the leasehold's fair market value will decrease. As a result,
its allocable portion of the basis of the property will diminish. This
treatment will increase the fee interest's allocable portion of the
basis which will in turn increase the likelihood of a loss on the sale
of the fee. Moreover, this approach does not violate the policy un-
derlying section 1031 because the taxpayer has substantially
changed his investment in the property and thus should be allowed
to deduct any loss incurred in closing out his fee ownership.
Admittedly, both proposed alternatives to section 1031 analysis
of a Century Electric sale and leaseback will produce some difficulty
in application. Both alternatives pose problems of valuation, and
the first alternative requires a determination whether the leasehold
is essentially equivalent to fee ownership. Similar problems exist,
however, in the present tax treatment of sale and leaseback transac-
tions. Although these problems can be quite complex in certain
situations, courts are equipped to resolve them. The existence of
these problems should not detract from the fact that both proposed
alternatives provide tax treatment more consistent with the eco-
nomic substance of the transaction than that resulting under a sec-
tion 1031 analysis.
(2) Jordan Marsh
Both Jordan Marsh and Leslie presented fact situations to
which section 1031 should not have applied. In each case the seller-
lessee sold property for its fair market value, and simultaneously
acquired a leasehold that did not constitute a part of the considera-
tion received in the transaction. Thus, there was no exchange of
properties to which section 1031 could apply. Although each court
correctly recognized that section 1031 did not apply, this finding
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improperly terminated the analysis in each case. Each court appar-
ently determined that the cases should be analyzed only under sec-
tion 1031, concluding that, since this section did not require non-
recognition, the loss deduction should be allowed. This conclusion,
however, should have been only the starting point of a proper analy-
sis. By proceeding to examine the economic substance of the trans-
actions in question, the courts could have determined the proper tax
treatment of these cases without creating the apparent conflict with
Century Electric.
When analyzed in terms of economic substance, Jordan Marsh
is the only case of the three that reached the correct result. This
result was reached, however, with improper, or at best inadequate,
reasoning. After properly determining that section 1031 did not
apply, the court simply held that because this section did not re-
quire nonrecognition treatment under the circumstances, the loss
deduction would be allowed. Although properly determining that
the loss deduction should be allowed, the court was incorrect in
basing this determination solely on the inapplicability of section
1031. The court should have undertaken an analysis of the economic
substance of the loss to determine whether it was the type of loss
that is deductible under section 165. This analysis would have re-
vealed that because the leasehold had no independent value and
was not transferred as part of the consideration for the property
sold, the taxpayer suffered an actual economic loss equal to the
difference between the consideration received and the basis of the
property. Under section 165, this actual economic loss should be
allowed as a deduction. Although the conclusion is the same as that
reached by the Jordan Marsh court under its section 1031 analysis,
the extended analysis indicates that Century Electric and Jordan
Marsh address two economically different fact situations and there-
fore do not conflict on the section 1031 issue.
Once it is recognized that the Jordan Marsh court should have
focused on the economic substance of the loss instead of on whether
section 1031 required nonrecognition of the loss, a single method of
analysis can be formulated to determine the tax treatment of the
type of sale and leaseback transactions present in both Century
Electric and Jordan Marsh. Instead of applying section 1031 analy-
sis, courts should apply the first alternative tax treatment suggested
above for Century Electric. Each transaction should be viewed as a
sale of the property for a package of consideration consisting of cash
plus a leasehold. If the leasehold has a value of zero, as in Jordan
Marsh, the loss equals the difference between the value of the cash
or other property received and the basis of the property sold. Under
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these circumstances, the leasehold has no value to be amortized
over the life of the lease. On the other hand, if the leasehold has an
actual value above zero, as in Century Electric, the loss amounts to
the difference between the basis of the property sold and the value
of the cash or other property received plus the value of the leasehold.
The value of the leasehold should then be amortized over the life of
the lease. In either case application of this analysis provides a result
consistent with the economic substance of the transaction and also
provides a single method for determining the tax treatment of the
types of transactions present in Jordan Marsh and Century
Electric."
(3) Leslie Co.
As indicated above, Leslie, like Jordan Marsh, presented a situ-
ation in which no section 1031 exchange of properties occurred. The
Leslie court also correctly recognized that section 1031 did not
apply, but failed to analyze the economic nature of the loss to deter-
mine whether it was deductible under section 165. Unlike Jordan
Marsh, however, this defect in the analysis in Leslie caused the
court to reach a result not in harmony with the economic realities
of the transaction.
Although the transactions in Leslie and Jordan Marsh appear
to be similar-the sale of property for fair market value, at a loss,
and the leaseback of the same property-close analysis reveals that
the two transactions have differing economic substance. The Jordan
Marsh transaction constituted a closing out of a losing venture and
a shifting of investment purpose. In Leslie, however, the sale was
not the closing out of a losing venture, but was instead a step in a
series of transactions designed from the beginning to provide the
taxpayer with an investment in a leasehold. The taxpayer specifi-
cally constructed the property with the intention of eventually using
and holding the property in the form of a leasehold. The loss suf-
fered on the sale of the property was actually a built-in cost of
81. Application of the second alternative method of analysis proposed for Century
Electric would also produce the same result in Jordan Marsh that was reached by the Second
Circuit and would provide a single analytical framework for both Century Electric and Jordan
Marsh transactions. Under this analysis the leasehold in Jordan Marsh would have a zero fair
market value and therefore would not be allocated any of the cost basis of the property. The
loss would be the difference between the value of the cash or other property received and the
basis of the property sold. In addition, there would be no basis in the leasehold to amortize
over the life of the lease. Although this approach provides a single method of analysis for these
cases, the first alternative method of analysis proposed for Century Electric provides a more




acquiring the leasehold, closely analogous to a premium payment
made to acquire a leasehold in a standard lease transaction. When
viewed in this manner, the loss on the sale of property in a Leslie
situation is not the type of loss that should be deductible under
section 165. Instead, the loss is in the nature of a capital expenditure
or lease acquisition cost that should be amortized over the life of the
lease.8 2 It is therefore suggested that in a transaction in which the
taxpayer constructs or acquires property with a view toward enter-
ing a sale or leaseback transaction, the proper tax treatment is to
amortize any resulting loss over the life of the lease as a cost of
acquiring the leasehold."3
(4) Summary
The analyses of Century Electric, Jordan Marsh, and Leslie
detailed above indicate that section 1031 analysis is not the proper
method for determining the tax treatment of a sale and leaseback
transaction in which the taxpayer suffers a loss on the sale. The
discussion above analyzes the cases in terms of their economic sub-
stance in order to determine the proper tax treatment. The applica-
tion of this approach reaches a result in harmony with the economic
substance of the transactions without causing the type of conflict
now existing between the holding in Century Electric and those in
Jordan Marsh and Leslie. This Note advances the approach de-
scribed in the preceding sections as the proper analysis for deter-
mining the tax treatment of a sale and leaseback transaction pro-
ducing a loss on the sale.
C. Recharacterization of the Sale and Leaseback as a Mortgage
Loan
(1) Traditional Analysis
The Service employs the recharacterization theory to attack
depreciation and rental deductions by the lessor and lessee under a
82. In the Tax Court consideration of Leslie, Judge Tannenwald registered a dissent
advocating this tax treatment of the loss suffered on the sale. The Third Circuit, however,
did not address the merits of his analysis. For a discussion of Judge Tannenwald's analysis,
see 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 672 (1977).
83. Although the proper tax treatment in these situations should depend on the actual
intent of the taxpayer, the administrative and evidentiary difficulties presented in attempt-
ing to prove intent would be overwhelming. Therefore a statute should be adopted prescribing
a minimum holding period after which the taxpayer will not be considered to have acquired
the property with a view toward entering into a sale and leaseback. If, on the other hand,
the taxpayer enters the sale and leaseback during the holding period, he should be held to
have acquired the property with a view toward entering into a sale and leaseback. This




sale and leaseback. Because the courts have experienced difficulty
in formulating standards for determining the proper characteriza-
tion of a sale and leaseback transaction, they have followed several
different approaches. Historically, courts allocated depreciation
deductions on the basis of legal title to the property and allowed a
rental deduction for payments for the use of property in which the
taxpayer had no equity." This approach, however, often elevated
form over substance. As a result, several major caveats developed.
In Helvering v. Lazarus & Co." the Supreme Court held that the
general "form over substance" doctrine permitted the judiciary to
reallocate ownership despite the presence or absence of legal title.
Citing the intentions of the parties as an important factor in deter-
mining ownership," the Court held that although the transaction
was structured as a transfer and leaseback, the Service should honor
the parties' intentions that the transaction be treated as a mortgage
loan. Since Lazarus, many lower courts have applied an intention-
of-the-parties test to determine the proper tax characterization of a
sale and leaseback transaction."
A second major caveat to the title test developed when related
parties had entered into a sale and leaseback. Courts closely scruti-
nize these transactions, requiring that they exhibit a business pur-
pose other than tax avoidance."s Even if the sale and leaseback is
otherwise valid, when the parties fail to show a purpose other than
tax avoidance, courts generally hold that the original seller-lessee is
the owner of the property" and recharacterize the rental payments
as loan repayments."
Several courts have completely abrogated the title test and
have developed an approach that relates the standards for charac-
terizing a sale and leaseback to the type of deduction
claimed-either depreciation by the purchaser-lessor or rental pay-
84. See Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944); St. Paul Union
Depot. Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1941); Helvering v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
89 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1937).
85. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
86. Id. at 254.
87. See, e.g., Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Kinzler v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH)
341 (1962). See also In re San Francisco Indus. Park, 307 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Cal. 1969)
(bankruptcy case).
88. Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1969); W.H.
Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Standard Envelope Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 41 (1950) (holding transaction to be a valid sale and leaseback
when a business purpose other than tax avoidance was shown).
89. See, e.g., W.H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
90. Id. If the seller-lessee is a corporation and the purchaser-lessor is a shareholder, the
rental payments might instead be recharacterized as a distribution of capital.
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ments by the seller-lessee. If the seller-lessee attempts to deduct
rental payments, the issue under this approach is whether the seller-
lessee has or is acquiring an equity interest" in the property. If the
deduction is for depreciation, the issue becomes whether the
purchaser-lessor might suffer economic gain or loss from any appre-
ciation or depreciation in the value of the property.
One of the principal factors upon which courts have focused in
determining these issues is the existence of a repurchase option and
the terms included therein. 92 A repurchase option allows the seller
to reacquire the property, and puts him in a position similar to that
of a mortgagor under a loan agreement. If the repurchase price is
nominal in relation to the value of the property at the time the seller
must exercise the option, or is relatively small in amount when
compared with the total payments under the lease, most courts hold
that the seller-lessee either has not parted with ownership of the
property or is reacquiring an equity interest. 3 If the seller either
must exercise the option or is under economic compulsion to do so,
courts almost uniformly recharacterize the transaction as a mort-
gage loan." The existence of a repurchase option, however, will not
always result in the determination that a sale and leaseback is a
mortgage loan. If the repurchase price approximates the current
estimated value of the property at the time the option must be
exercised or is tied to a future appraisal of the property's fair market
value, the court might recognize the legitimacy of the sale and lease-
back. 5 These circumstances support the argument that the
purchaser-lessor is the true owner because he receives the benefit of
any appreciation in the value of the property.
A second factor that courts consider important is a disparity
between the fair market value of the property and the purchase
price under the sale and leaseback. A purchase price significantly
lower than the value of the property indicates that the transaction
is a mortgage loan, especially if the lease contains a repurchase
option. Two additional factors that influence many courts are which
party bears the risk of loss and whether the lease rental payments
are disproportionate in relation to the fair rental value of the prop-
erty. Courts often allocate depreciation deductions to the party that
91. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
92. See, e.g., Commissioner v. H.F. Neighbors Realty Co., 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936);
Shaffer Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 356 (1951).
93. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 672-73.
94. Whether economic compulsion exists depends in part on the relationship between
the anticipated value of the property at the end of the lease term and the option price. Id. at
673.
95. See id. at 674.
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has the "at risk" investment. In addition, if rental payments are
disproportionately high in relation to the rental value of the prop-
erty, courts often wholly or partially deny a rental deduction on the
ground that the seller-lessee is acquiring an equity interest in the
property. These factors alone are not conclusive, but gain impor-
tance when combined with other factors such as a repurchase op-
tion.
The variety of judicial tests in sale and leaseback cases indi-
cates the difficulty courts have had in devising standards to deter-
mine the tax consequences of these transactions. Although the fac-
tors identified above are not an exhaustive list of all the factors that
a court might consider relevant, it does include those that are most
important. Because the resolution of many sale and leaseback issues
depends on the facts of each case, more definite guides to the judi-
cial treatment of sale and leaseback transactions are difficult if not
impossible to formulate.
(2) Recent Cases
The traditional analysis described above provides the back-
ground for the decisions reached in several recent sale and leaseback
cases. Since 1974 there have been three significant cases in the area,
two at the court of appeals level and one in the Supreme Court."
This section will briefly discuss each of these cases and consider its
effect on the tax law relating to sale and leaseback transactions.
American Realty Trust v. United States" presented the issue
whether, after a sale and leaseback of a tract of commercial real
estate, the seller-lessee or the purchaser-lessor was entitled to claim
the tax deductions for depreciation. American, a real estate invest-
ment trust, purchased a tract of resort property from Helmsley, an
individual entrepreneur, for $7,000,000. The purchase price was
composed of $2,500,000 in cash and the assumption of a $4,500,000
mortgage. American then leased the property to Palm Beach Tow-
ers, Inc. (Towers), Helmsley's wholly owned corporation, under a
net lease arrangement for a period of twenty-one years plus renewal
options totaling fifty years. The lease also contained certain rental
reduction clauses and provided that Towers was to share in the
proceeds of any condemnation award. Helmsley and American also
executed an option agreement that allowed Helmsley to repurchase
the property at certain stated prices. Helmsley exercised this option
during the sixth year of the lease term.
96. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); American Realty Trust v.
United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
97. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
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During the period the lease was in force, American took sub-
stantial depreciation deductions for the property. The Service au-
dited American and denied the deduction, determining that the sale
and leaseback arrangement was actually a mortgage loan agreement
and that American was not the owner of the property for deprecia-
tion purposes. American paid the resulting deficiency and filed for
a refund in federal district court. The jury found that the transac-
tion was a good faith sale and leaseback and allowed the deduc-
tion.98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ac-
cepted the jury's factual findings, but considered the issue as a
question of law. The Service argued that the transaction should be
recharacterized as a loan, noting that Helmsley retained all the
significant benefits of ownership, that he was economically com-
pelled to exercise his repurchase option, and that the rental pay-
ments constituted interest payments at a rate of 10V2 percent." In
affirming the lower court decision, the Fourth Circuit panel rejected
these arguments and focused in part on the intent of the parties.
The court indicated that the parties had intended in good faith to
undertake a sale and leaseback. In addition, however, the court
emphasized that Helmsley was not under economic compulsion to
repurchase the property and that the original sales price of
$7,000,000 was the fair market value of the property. These factors,
coupled with the intent of the parties, induced the court to hold that
the transaction was a valid sale and leaseback and to allow Ameri-
can a deduction for depreciation.
In American Realty the Fourth Circuit adapted the traditional
intent test to a multiple factor analysis. Rather than consider the
intent of the parties as controlling, the court analyzed additional
factors-the repurchase option and the fairness of the purchase
price. The court failed, however, to indicate how much weight it
placed on each factor, or whether these were the only relevant fac-
tors. Thus, American Realty arguably stands for the proposition
that even if the parties clearly intend a sale and leaseback transac-
tion, a court will require a showing of other factors indicating that
the transaction is not a mortgage loan. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, it does little to alleviate the confusion surrounding judicial
interpretation of the sale and leaseback because it gives no clear
indication of the factors that must be shown or the weight they will
be given.




In Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner'0o the Third Circuit considered
a denial by the Service of a rental deduction claimed under a sale
and leaseback transaction. The court stated that the sole question
was whether the transaction was a financing arrangement between
the parties or a valid sale. The case concerned two separate transac-
tions in which Sun Oil sold a total of 320 unimproved service station
sites to the tax-exempt General Electric Pension Trust (Trust) and
simultaneously leased them back for a period of twenty-five years.
The lease contained options to renew for a total of sixty-five years
at significantly reduced rentals. The rentals were set at a rate that
would amortize Trust's investment over the primary term of the
lease at an interest rate of 4% percent for the first transaction (120
sites) and 5% percent for the second transaction (200 sites). The
lease provided for a "net lease" arrangement and also gave Sun Oil
sole right to negotiate any condemnation awards. The lease further
provided that Sun Oil had the right to determine whether to retain
any condemnation award and continue to pay rent, or to transfer the
award to Trust and cancel the lease. In addition, the lease contained
several repurchase options under which Sun Oil could reacquire the
property. Sun Oil could exercise these repurchase options for prices
that under certain circumstances would be equal to the appraised
value of the property, but under others would be based on the pres-
ent value of the remaining lease payments plus a set premium that
insured Trust a five percent return. The lease provided, with certain
limited exceptions, that Trust could reject any repurchase offer, but
also stated that such a rejection would terminate the lease. If Trust
rejected any repurchase offer, the lease gave Sun Oil the right to
tender substitute property of equal value (to be determined by Sun
Oil's cost basis) and required Trust to accept this property in ex-
change for the property under lease."0'
The Service disallowed Sun Oil's tax deduction for the rental
payments under the lease on the grounds that the transaction did
not constitute a true sale and that the rental payments were not a
valid business expense. Rejecting the Service's argument, the Tax
Court held the rental payments deductible. The Third Circuit re-
versed and upheld the Service's denial of the deduction. The Third
Circuit panel viewed the prime issue as whether the ownership in-
terests of the lessor and lessee as characterized by the parties were
consistent with traditional substantive business bargains between
100. 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
101. This provision of the lease in essence allowed Sun Oil to reap the benefit of any
appreciation in value of the property.
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lessors and lessees. In holding that Sun Oil's sale and leaseback
transaction in actuality constituted a financing arrangement, the
court focused on a multitude of factors. The numerous risks, bur-
dens, and benefits borne and controlled by Sun Oil as lessee were,
according to the court, strong indicia of ownership. 0 2 The court also
found the particular structure of lease payments, including the pres-
ence of a guaranteed rate of return for the lessor and prepayment
penalties, markedly similar to debt financing.' In addition, the
court found the inclusion of an option for the lessee to acquire the
property at the end of the primary term at the value to the lessor
to be a form of equity."o4
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit gave no indication of
how much weight it gave any particular factor. The court admitted
that the lease contained provisions that indicated a valid sale and
leaseback, oI but did not identify which or how many countervailing
factors were necessary to overturn the parties' characterization of
the transaction. In its six page analysis of these countervailing fac-
tors, the court did little more than list them in detail and describe
their operation under the particular facts of this case. In the final
analysis, Sun Oil gives little guidance to practitioners attempting
102. In summarizing the facts upon which it based its holding the court stated:
As the lessee, [Sun Oil] bore the burdens, risks, and responsibilities for the proper-
ties, including the obligation to provide the Trust with a fixed guaranteed return under
all circumstances and conditions. The lessee also controlled important benefits tradi-
tionally reserved to the owner of property: the lessee had the right to negotiate the
settlement or accept the condemnation award and receive the payment; in the event of
total or partial condemnation the lessee retained the right to terminate the lease . . .
and to make a "rejectable offer" which for all practical purposes was unrejectable; the
lessee, in any event, enjoyed the right to substitute other land if perchance an offer was
rejected or in substitution of a rejectable offer. These risks, burdens, and benefits are
strong attributes of ownership, not of a leasehold interest.
562 F.2d at 269.
103. The court stated:
The leases also bear marked similarities to debt financing . . . including the struc-
tural and guaranteed interest rate . . . the prepayment penalties, the schedule of pay-
ments, and the rejectable offer procedures. The rents have no visible connection with
the economic value of the property but are evidently related to a fixed interest return
on the advances. Finally, the options to acquire the property at the end of the primary
term at the value to the lessor is a form of "equity" because the value to lessor is really
the present value of future payments for sixty-five years at a specified rate.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court stated:
We also note that some of the provisions of the leases in the instant case when viewed
independently do not brand the transaction as a financing arrangement. A number of
other important features, however, "have been employed in the same transaction with
the cumulative effect of depriving [the lessor] of any significant ownership interest."
Id. (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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to ascertain the tax consequences of a sale and leaseback transac-
tion. Instead, the case only adds to the confused state of the law.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United StatesH is the most recent Supreme
Court statement on the proper characterization of sale and lease-
back transactions for tax purposes. The Court's opinion, however,
does little to clarify the law in this area. Stated narrowly, the Court
confronted the issue whether the purchaser-lessor was entitled to a
deduction for depreciation and for interest on a mortgage on the
property. The more important issue, however, concerned the proper
allocation of ownership for tax purposes under a sale and leaseback
transaction.
The facts of the case are extremely complex. The lessee, Wor-
then Bank and Trust Company (Worthen), leased a tract of land to
Frank Lyon Company (Lyon) for twenty-five years with options to
renew for an additional fifty years. Worthen constructed an office
building on the leasehold and sold it to Lyon for the cost of construc-
tion. Worthen then leased back the building and subleased the land
for twenty-five years with options to renew for an additional forty
years, leaving a ten-year period during which the improvements
were not subject to Worthen's leaseback. At the end of this ten-year
period, the land and all improvements were to revert to Worthen in
fee.
Lyon paid $500,000 toward the almost $8,000,000 purchase
price from its own funds. The remainder of the purchase price was
obtained through financing previously arranged by Worthen with
New York Life Insurance Company. The leaseback was a net lease
arrangement, and the lease rental payments during the twenty-five
year primary term of the lease were exactly the amount necessary
to amortize fully Lyon's long-term note with New York Life. The
lease also contained options allowing Worthen to repurchase the
property at the end of the eleventh, fifteenth, twentieth and twenty-
fifth years of the lease. The purchase price under each option
equaled the unamortized balance of Lyon's note to New York Life
plus an amount equal to Lyon's initial investment compounded at
a six percent annual rate. Worthen retained the rights to investment
tax credits and to sales tax incurred during construction. The par-
ties agreed to apply any condemnation awards or insurance pro-
ceeds resulting in a termination of the building lease first to repay
the mortgage and then to Lyon up to the amount necessary to return
its original investment plus a return of six percent compounded
annually, with any balance accruing to Worthen.
106. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
1979]1 975
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Lyon, as purchaser-lessor, took a tax deduction for depreciation
and for the interest paid on the New York Life mortgage. The Ser-
vice disallowed these deductions, claiming that the transaction was
in reality a financing arrangement. The district court rejected the
Service's argument and allowed the deduction. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Service's
contentions and reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of an apparent conflict with American Realty Trust. The
Court apparently agreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding that the
important issue in analyzing the sale and leaseback was whether
Lyon had retained enough "significant and genuine attributes of the
traditional lessor status" 07 to be entitled to the deductions claimed.
In making this determination, however, the Court disagreed with
the lower court's analysis of the facts and reversed, thus allowing
Lyon to take the claimed deductions.
Although this result is probably correct in light of the facts of
the case, the Court's opinion gives no indication of the general stan-
dards used in reaching its determination. The Court did not apply
traditional lines of sale and leaseback analysis, but instead used a
multiple factor approach. The Court cited over twenty-five factors
it considered relevant to its decision,"s but did not indicate the
relative significance of particular factors. Only in its holding sen-
tence did the Court place particular emphasis on any factors:
where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realties,
is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government
should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.'"
The five factors set forth in this holding appear only to be a listing
of the categories into which the Court's twenty-five plus factors
fell,u0 and provide no standards by which to judge future sale and
leaseback transactions. The Court simply took an overall view of the
transaction and decided that the deductions should be allowed. In
essence, the decision can be viewed as an instinctive judgment by
the Court that, under the given facts, the transaction was a valid
sale and leaseback. This analysis may be satisfactory for application
on a case-by-case basis, but as a practical matter it totally under-
mines the possibility of adequate tax planning, since few if any
107. Id. at 584.
108. For a listing of these factors, see Zarrow & Gordon, supra note 3, at 43.
109. 435 U.S. at 583-84.
110. Zarrow & Gordon, supra note 3, at 46.
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future transactions will be on all fours with Lyon and it is impossible
to determine which of the factors listed by the Court will control.
(3) Analysis of American Realty, Sun Oil, and Lyon
In determining whether a particular sale and leaseback should
be recharacterized as a mortgage loan, the courts in American
Realty, Sun Oil, and Lyon faced the basic problems that have made
it difficult for the judiciary to formulate adequate standards for
resolving the recharacterization issue. The basic question is deter-
mining the owner of the property for tax purposes. The basic prob-
lem is that no single "owner" possessing all the attributes of
ownership can be identified and the court therefore must choose
between two possible owners, each possessing some but not all of
the attributes of ownership. The problem was perhaps best charac-
terized by the Fourth Circuit in Sun Oil when it stated that the
relevant question is whether the ownership interests of the lessor
and lessee as characterized by the parties are consistent with tradi-
tional substantive business bargains between lessors and lessees."n
In recent cases that have addressed this question, however, the issue
has been complicated by the uniqueness and complexity of the
transactions. The courts have not only faced the problem of having
to make this determination without adequate standards to guide
them, but have also faced the difficulty of applying these inade-
quate standards to increasingly complex fact situations.
The courts in American Realty, Sun Oil, and Lyon character-
ized the determination of the true owner of the transferred property
as a question of law. In making this determination, however, each
court marshaled and weighed the available evidence much as it
would have in deciding a question of fact. Several commentators
have analyzed this approach in detail, focusing on each court's
treatment of the issue and the factors that were relevant to its
decision.11 2 This analysis reveals that the cases do not develop a
general rule for determining who is the true owner of the property
in the transaction. Instead, each court focused solely upon the
unique fact situation before it without attempting to build upon
prior precedent to formulate a coherent standard. Therefore, further
examination of these cases will not reveal a decisional rule.
Because these cases do not establish a new decisional rule, the
important aspect of the cases is the courts' approach in analyzing
111. 562 F.2d at 262 (quoting Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale-Leasebacks: An Analysis of
These Transactions After the Lyon Decision, 45 J. TAx. 146, 148 (1976)).




the ownership issue. Each court implicitly rejected a strict applica-
tion of any existing test to determine ownership of property trans-
ferred in a sale and leaseback. In American Realty the court, al-
though focusing upon intent of the parties as one factor, actually
based its decision upon a synthesis of several factors. The courts in
Sun Oil and Lyon simply identified a laundry list of relevant facts,
determined the impact of the combination of those facts, and de-
cided that the combination indicated that a particular party owned
the property. In essence, all three courts, faced with the task of
determining which of two possible owners of property would be con-
sidered the owner for tax purposes, rejected any analysis that fo-
cused on a limited number of factors and took an overall view that
incorporated all operative factors, without any explicit determina-
tion of their relative importance. This "totality of the transaction"
analysis of sale and leaseback transactions is the important develop-
ment in these cases.
Adoption of this totality of the transaction approach to sale and
leaseback cases by two circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court indicates a substantial judicial shift in sale and leaseback
analysis. The courts, however, were more than justified in rejecting
existing tests. The legal title and intention-of-the-parties tests ele-
vate form over substance and often have little relation to the eco-
nomic realities of a sale and leaseback transaction. Further, they are
so inflexible in their application that they do not allow a court to
take into consideration the policies underlying deductions such as
rental payments, depreciation, and interest payments. Other exist-
ing tests that relate the determination of ownership to the type of
deduction claimed and the policies underlying that deduction"3
focus only on a limited number of factors. This limited focus often
produces a result at odds with the economic substance of the sale
and leaseback because the transaction may include many relevant
factors that are not taken into consideration. The increasing com-
plexity of sale and leaseback transactions and the variety of clauses
and options that parties may include in a lease make it almost
impossible for a court to prevent abuses of the tax law by applying
a test that considers only a limited number of factors. Thus an
analysis that considers all the circumstances surrounding a sale and
leaseback is a vast improvement over any test that focuses only on
a limited number of factors that may or may not be crucial in any
given situation.
The totality of the transaction approach offers the best method
113. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
978 [Vol. 32:945
SALE AND LEASEBACK
of analysis for judicial application. Only an analysis that takes into
consideration all factors in a complex sale and leaseback case can
yield a result in harmony with the economic realities of the transac-
tion. The totality of the transaction approach is sufficiently flexible
to be applicable to all sale and leaseback transactions and also
allows a court significant freedom to prevent abuse of the tax laws.
Since a court is not equipped to impose substantive changes in the
tax laws that might reduce the complexity of the issue, an analysis
that takes a comprehensive view of all relevant factors is the best
approach available.
Although the totality of the transaction approach is the best
analysis available to a court, it is not a wholly satisfactory solution
to the problems that arise in determining the owner of sale and
leaseback property for tax purposes. At least two significant prob-
lems arise in the application of this approach. First, since the ap-
proach focuses on a multitude of factors, many of which are unique
to each transaction, cases decided under this approach have little
precedential value. Only if a previously decided case is on all fours
with a case in litigation will the prior case control. Because of the
unique character of each sale and leaseback transaction, this iden-
tity of facts is unlikely to occur. This fact may work to the Service's
advantage in attacking the validity of sale and leaseback transac-
tions. Because it will be able to distinguish virtually any previous
decision upholding a sale and leaseback, the Service will be able to
attack any transaction it considers abusive of the tax laws. Simi-
larly, taxpayers whose transactions are challenged will be unable to
rely on precedent and will be forced to defend the transaction on its
individual merits.
A second and more important problem with the totality of the
transaction approach is that it does not provide any certainty of tax
consequences for tax planners and therefore damages the utility of
the sale and leaseback transactions as a business planning tool.
Because the approach emphasizes factual analysis, it causes confu-
sion about the probable tax characterization of any particular sale
and leaseback. This confusion detracts from the desirability of a
sale and leaseback as a business planning tool since the tax conse-
quences of this type of transaction often play an important if not
crucial role in determining whether the parties should utilize a sale
and leaseback and how the transaction should be structured. Thus
certainty, or at least a predictable probability, of tax consequences
is necessary if the sale and leaseback is to survive as a useful busi-
ness planning tool. The totality of the transaction approach does not




Any solution to the problem of determining the proper tax char-
acterization of a sale and leaseback must adequately accommodate
two competing policy considerations. On the one hand, the Service
has an interest in preventing tax abuses that arise from sale and
leaseback transactions; on the other hand, business planners need
a certainty of tax consequences that will allow them to utilize ade-
quately this useful business tool. Although the interests of prevent-
ing tax abuse and providing tax certainty do not inherently conflict,
they do conflict in the sale and leaseback situation. The complex
division of the attributes of ownership in a sale and leaseback trans-
action makes it especially difficult to police tax abuse. Thus courts
must take a flexible case-by-case approach to the issues presented.
Because courts must scrutinize the particular facts of each transac-
tion to determine the proper tax treatment, they are unable to pro-
vide certainty as to tax consequences in future cases. This Note
argues, therefore, that the judiciary cannot provide a solution to the
problems that arise in characterizing sale and leaseback transac-
tions for tax purposes. These problems are best suited to resolution
through the administrative rulemaking processes of the Service.
This Note proposes that the Service review its position concern-
ing sale and leaseback transactions, determine the abuses that must
be prohibited, and promulgate regulations aimed at preventing
these abuses while providing certainty of tax consequences for valid
sale and leaseback transactions. As a format for these regulations,
this Note suggests that the Service promulgate a series of objective
tests that, when met, will provide a "safe harbor" for a sale and
leaseback transaction. These tests should focus on the principal
attributes of property ownership and the policies underpinning the
tax deductions available in a sale and leaseback. Although the tests
should minimize the possibility of tax abuse, the regulations must
not be drawn too restrictively. In order to serve the dual functions
of providing certainty of tax consequences and reducing confronta-
tion, and thus the amount of litigation between the taxpayer and
the Service, the regulations must allow enough flexibility of busi-
ness planning within the safe harbor so that a businessman wishing
to use a sale and leaseback would prefer to structure his transaction
within the safe harbor and obtain predictable tax consequences
rather than risk litigation concerning the proper tax characteriza-
tion of the transaction. In addition, if the regulation is not overly
restrictive, the Service should be able to convince the courts to
scrutinize closely the potential for abuse in any transaction that
oversteps the bounds of the safe harbor. The flexibility required to
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make this regulation practicable will- require a trade-off between
potential for tax abuse and flexibility for business planners. A pro-
perly drawn regulation," however, could go far in eliminating the
114. This Note does not purport to propose a new regulation in detail. The general
framework suggested below, however, is offered as a basis for such a regulation.
Framework for Regulation
The proposed regulation should first require that the lease portion of the sale and lease-
back transaction be a true lease and not a disguised installment sale contract. The regulation
should then provide a series of objective tests designed to assure that:
(1) The purchaser-lessor has a substantial amount of "at risk" capital committed to
the property;
(2) The benefits of appreciation and risks of depreciation of the property accrue to the
purchaser-lessor; and,
(3) The transaction has an acceptable minimum of the characteristics of a mortgage
loan.
The regulation also should require that the seller-lessee demonstrate a business purpose
other than the avoidance for entering into the sale and leaseback transaction. If the transac-
tion meets these five requirements-true sale and leaseback, "at risk" capital, appreciation
accruing to lessor, an acceptable minimum of loan characteristics, and business purpose-the
possibilities of tax abuse are greatly minimized. The regulation should therefore provide that
if the transaction meets these requirements, the Service will consider it a valid sale and
leaseback and will not attack any deductions flowing from that characterization.
The following list sets forth in outline form the important considerations that should be
incorporated into the objective tests to assure that the transaction meets these requirements.
(1) At risk capital:
a) The purchaser-lessor does not have a contractual right to sell the property
to the seller-lessee or a related party;
b) The purchaser-lessor is primarily liable on all financing related to the pur-
chase of the property, and all loans are full recourse;
c) No loans of the purchaser-lessor are guaranteed by the seller-lessee or a
related party; and,
d) The seller-lessee has not guaranteed the purchaser-lessor a return of his
"at risk" capital.
(2) Appreciation to purchaser-lessor:
a) The seller-lessee does not have the right to reacquire the property (by any
means) at a price below the fair market value of the property at the time of
reacquisition (except that a set-price repurchase option in which the price can
be shown to be a valid estimate of the fair market value of the property on the
option date should satisfy the test); and,
b) Any gain from a condemnation award should accrue to the purchaser-lessor.
(3) Minimum Loan Characteristics:
a) The sales price of the property is equal to its fair market value;
b) The rental payments under the lease are equal to the property's fair rental
value; and,
c) The lease is not structured so as to provide the purchaser-lessor with a
recoupment of his investment at a guaranteed rate of return.
Portions of this framework are similar to the provisions of Revenue Procedure 75-21, 1975-
1 C.B. 715, that set out the requirements a taxpayer must meet before the Service will issue
a ruling that a leveraged lease will be considered a lease for tax purposes. Revenue Procedure
75-21, however, is very restrictive in its application and limited in its coverage, and also
requires that a taxpayer obtain a revenue ruling in order to be certain of the tax consequences
of the lease. The regulation advocated by this Note is much more liberal in application and
much broader in coverage.
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tax abuse possibilities of a sale and leaseback while providing cer-
tainty of tax consequences in a broad area. In light of the significant
problems stemming from the present tax treatment of sale and
leaseback transactions, the benefits of tax certainty and minimized
litigation obtainable from this approach would outweigh any small
costs resulting from this trade-off.
IV. CONCLUSION
Determining the proper tax characterization of a sale and lease-
back. transaction presents a recurring problem for the courts, the
Service, and tax planners. For over thirty-five years the judiciary
has attempted without success to formulate standards for determin-
ing the tax treatment of a sale and leaseback. This continual formu-
lation and reformulation process has left the law in a state of confu-
sion. As a result the utility of this business tool has been under-
mined. Much of this confusion, however, is unnecessary and could
be eliminated through a proper analysis of sale and leaseback trans-
actions. Courts must recognize that a sale and leaseback is only a
structural "form" for a transaction and must analyze the sale and
leaseback to determine its true economic substance. An economic
substance analysis reveals that the conflict between the decision in
Century Electric and those in Jordan Marsh and Leslie should not
exist, and serves to eliminate the confusion surrounding these cases.
Even if this confusion is eliminated, however, significant problems
remain in the tax treatment of sale' and leaseback transactions,
especially those that the Service chooses to attack through recharac-
terization as a mortgage loan. The totality of the transaction ap-
proach that courts have adopted to determine the recharacter-
ization issue in recent cases has caused great uncertainty for tax
planners. Part of this uncertainty is inherent in the complex nature
of modem sale and leaseback transactions and cannot be eliminated
by the courts. Thus only the Service's power to promulgate regula-
tions provides an efficient means of eliminating the uncertainty
connected with the determination whether a sale and leaseback
should be recharacterized as a mortgage loan. In the final analysis,
Regarding the first requirement of the proposed regulatory framework, an existing body
of tax law addresses the question whether a lease is a disguised installment sale contract. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-408, 1972-2 C.B. 86; Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 57-371,
1957-2 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 55-542, 1955-2 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19; Rev. Rul.
55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39. In formulating tests to assure compliance with this requirement, the
regulation should incorporate the tests developed in this body of law.
Regarding the parenthetical to consideration (a) listed under "Appreciation to the
purchaser-lessor," the taxpayer should bear the burden of proof of the validity of the estimate.
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neither the courts nor the Service can totally eliminate the confu-
sion and uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of a sale and
leaseback. In conjunction, however, they could go far in eliminating
many of the problems that exist. This Note urges that both the
Service and the judiciary reevaluate their present approach to the
determination of the proper tax characterization of a sale and lease-
back transaction in an attempt to provide certainty of tax conse-
quences and a tax treatment in accord with the economic substance
of each transaction.
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